Greg's Corner

When the Bank Is the Weak Link in Scams

By Greg Collier

A recent investigation by ProPublica has once again laid bare the critical role banks play in enabling international fraud networks, often by doing very little. The report follows the case of a small family-run business in Boston that found itself entangled in a lawsuit over a crypto-related scam, despite having no connection to cryptocurrency or even an account at the bank involved. The bank in question, it turns out, had allowed a fraudster to open an account in the business’s name without identification, which was later used to move hundreds of thousands of dollars from scam victims.

The scam in question is part of a growing phenomenon known as “pig butchering,” a long con in which victims are emotionally manipulated over time to invest increasing sums of money into fraudulent schemes. The funds are typically wired to domestic bank accounts that appear legitimate, then quickly moved and converted to cryptocurrency for laundering across borders. Many of these scams originate from Southeast Asian compounds operated by criminal syndicates with billions of dollars in annual proceeds.

Banks are at the center of this laundering infrastructure. They are supposed to serve as gatekeepers, preventing the creation of fraudulent accounts and flagging suspicious activity. But as ProPublica outlines, the reality is often far more permissive. Criminal groups exploit lax verification protocols and the lack of mandatory fraud detection standards. In the case involving the Boston truck repair business, a Chase account was reportedly opened online using only a business identification number, with no personal ID or in-person verification.

Scammers are well aware of these vulnerabilities and operate entire marketplaces to exploit them. Messaging apps like Telegram have hosted channels where money laundering facilitators openly advertise U.S. bank accounts for rent. These accounts are used to collect stolen funds, convert them to crypto, and forward them to overseas actors. Despite existing regulations requiring banks to monitor for suspicious behavior, enforcement is inconsistent. The law mandates that banks design anti-money laundering programs, but it does not require those programs to be effective.

This regulatory gap creates a situation where the burden of vigilance often falls on the victim. In the ProPublica report, one scam victim lost nearly $400,000 by wiring money to accounts tied to shell companies at major financial institutions. Even after realizing he had been defrauded, his efforts to reverse the wires were largely unsuccessful. It took a lawsuit and media inquiry for one bank to finally return his money. That money had been sitting in a frozen account for months.

We’ve been documenting bank scam stories for years where victims not only lose their savings but are met with indifference or hostility from the very institutions that facilitated the fraud. Often, banks treat scam victims as liabilities or even suspects, rather than customers in need of assistance.

Some countries are taking stronger action. The United Kingdom now mandates that banks reimburse victims of authorized payment scams. Australia is moving toward greater information sharing among banks. Thailand has created a centralized fraud register to shut down suspicious accounts more efficiently. In contrast, the United States continues to rely on voluntary guidelines and industry self-regulation, even as fraud rates rise.

ProPublica’s report highlights just how systemic this problem has become. It’s not just about one fraud or one bank, but a banking system that routinely fails to keep bad actors out. As long as institutions can look the other way without consequences, these scams will continue to thrive.

We can only hope that this in-depth reporting begins to move the needle. Victims deserve more than platitudes and procedural roadblocks. Banks must be held to a higher standard before more lives and livelihoods are destroyed.